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SUMMARY
The justification for the setting of rate maximums and
minimums by the New Zealand Ministry of Transport for the rural
road goods transport industry is reviewed in the light of the
continuing need for greater efficiency in the farm servicing
industries. Doubts are raised as to the validity of the
original justifications in today's context. Because the rural
road goods transport industry provides an unscheduled service,
rate setting by Government is not clearly consistent with
economic efficiency. The forces of price competition are
not acting to reduce prices. Rather, farmers are paying for the
luxury of service competition with rates being fixed by a third
party, within a narrow range and on a cost-plus criterion. It
is suggested that minimum rate controls should be removed,
that rates charged should more closely reflect cost differences
and that controls over entry to the industry should be relaxed.

r~ll fonms of vate regulation ave bad~ and the
more restrictive they are~ i,e,~ the more they
cause prices to deviate from the efficient
prices~ the more harmful they wiU be It.
~ Conrad J, Oort (19?O)~ p,l?O
1, INTRODUCTION
The road transport industry in New Zealand is closely regulat.ed
by Government. This regulation extends beyond safety and technical
regulations into the economic aspects of road transport. Entry into
the industry is restricted, competition between carriers and against
railways is restricted, and both maximum and minimum prices which
carriers may charge are fixed by Government. The historical development
of these regulatory practices, as is the case in most Western countries,
has its origins in the 1930 ' s.
1 Material shortages during the second
World War constrained progress in road transport and set a precedent
for tight regulatory control. During the industry's rapid expansion
through the 1950's policies of close regulation were continued and
restrictive practices consolidated. It is time for the fundamental
justification for this close regulation over road transport to be
reviewed in the interest of transport users.
1
The international influence of the Salter Report (U.K. Ministry of
Transport (1932), Report of the Conference on Road and Rail
Transport) was considerable, Many of the measures in the Report
relating to economic regulation have subsequently been soundly
criticised by economists e.g. Mundy, D.L. (1965), "The Economics
of Road Haulage Licencing", Oxford Economic Papers, 17 (1) ,
pp.lll-129; Joy, Stewart (1964), ltUnregulated Road Haulage:The
Australian Experience", Oxford Economic Papers l6(2}, pp. 275-285;
Conrad J. Oort (1970), The Economic Regulati.on of the the Road
Transport Industry, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Economics Department Report EC-177.
2,
The goal of economic efficiency in the transport industry
needs to be given greater emphasis in the future 0 In the past
economic efficiency bas not always been the primary objective
. .' 2 .beb~nd Government pol.:Lcles. Nowhere ~s the need for economic
efficiency more important than in the rural goods transport
section of the road transport industry wbich meets the bulk of New
Zealand's farming sectorUs transport needs. 3 Falling profitability
in farming has been threatening its viability4 and therefore has
been threatening a large proportion of New Zealand's foreign
exchange earnings and hence labour employment capacities. One means
towards retaining profitability in farming is to minimise rural
transport costs.
In this paper the justification for rate regulation in
the rural road goods transport industry is reviewed and fresh
objectives are proposed 0 Less restrictive regulatory controls
are suggested.
2
For a discussion of objectives other than economic efficiency
see Kolsen, H.M. (1974), "Regulation, Efficiency and the Public
Interest", Into J. of Transport Economics, 1 (1) pp. 40-63.
3
Survey by the author, Ambler:, T. I. (1975), Use Made of Transport
by Farmers: A pilot Survey with Results Relating to Ashburton
County, A E R U Discussion Paper No 0 30, Lincoln College.
4
Report of the Farm Incomes Advisory Committee (Zanetti Committee)
to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisberies (1975), pp. 94-115,
Wellington.
"3.
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Price controls over road transport in New Zealand were
firs-t officially mooted in 1933, shortly after the introduction of
licencing to the industry in 1931. 5 The Transport Department's
Report of 1933 stated that ••••
it was abundantly clear that~ with competition
controUed by the licencing machinery~ the question
of fixing charges must ultimately be undertaken to
- -
protect the public against undue exploitation of the
partial monopo listie position in which many operators
win ultimately find themselves~ and also to ensure
that the fuZZ benefits of regulatory control are
passed on to the pub lid in the form of reduced
t t ha . ,,6--ranspor c - rges ....
A further Justification for price controls in the same Report was ....
fr • ••• to protect licenced operators from uneconomic
'rate cutting' by irresponsible competitors".7
Licencing authorities were given the discretionary power to
become involved in price setting but the policy of the day
favoured the matter being le;Et:. to competition and settlements
8between operators and users.
5
Transport Act, 1931.
6
Appendices to Journals of House of Representatives (A.J.H. of R.)
7
Ibid
8
A.J.H. of R., H40, 1934, p.23
4.
There was little price fixing before 1938, From about that year
the principle of regional rate schedules was developed with their
acceptance being required by Licencing Authorities in some regions
as a condition for the granting of licences,9 Price fixation
procedures became increasingly complex under the influence of the
accountants associated with the wartime Goods~Service Charges
Tribunal (appointed in 1942) and the Transport Charges Committee
(constituted in 1949). In 1950 the responsibility for setting
h · ,. d h ., f 10t e 1ndustry s pr1ces passe to t e Comm1SS1oner or Transport
(now the Secretary for Transport) and the procedure of setting
regional rate schedules with maximum and minimum prices became
established. Undoubtedly the granting to the Commissioner of the
right to fix charges on his own initiative,ll a right not possessed
by previous rate fixing authorities, ensured that this procedure
would evolve and apply universally in the industry. The procedure
by which the Commissioner freely used his power to initiate the
fixing of prices was so well established by 1958 that his right to
refrain from fixing prices until operators and users had failed to
12
agree on the matter had become redundant and was repealed.
9
A.J.H. of R., H40, 1938, p.33
10
Transport Amendment Act, 1950
11
Ibid, s 123 (2)
12
Transport Amendment Act, 1958
5.
Today rate schedules are published by the Ministry of Transport
for some 28 rural areas. These schedules are arrived at following
an in depth study of operating characteristics experienced in the
region by a sample of operators. These characteristics include
vehicle types in use, laden miles, commodities hauled, average
loads, availability of backloads, annual vehicle miles, annual
vehicle hours in use, trip length distributions, and so on,
Trucking costs in the areas are synthesised on the basis of these
findings allowing a 10 percent mark-up on costs. Each schedule
specifies maximum rates by distance and by commodity along with
time-plus-milage rates for hires not specifically covered in the
commodity classification. The schedules also specify the volume of
use required before a contract may be negotiated between an
operator and a user, backhaul rebates and a variety of special
charges and discounts applicable to operating conditions in the
region. Minimum rates are set at 10 percent below the maximum
rates (which are those specified in the schedule).
Periodically, in response to cost increases, the Secretary
of Transport grants percentage increases to apply to all rates
thereby updating schedules which could be based on a survey conducted
as long ago as 1963 as in the case of North Canterbury.
Government departments exercise price controls over most New
Zealand industries; but over road transport the controls extend to
price setting. Few other industries, especially industries whose
private enterprise ownership is as fragmented as that of road
13transport, would countenance such government control.
13
There are some 2,000 firms engaged in rural goods transport in
New Zealand according to figures given in King, M.A. (1971),
The Structure and Ownership of the New Zealand Licenced Road
Goods Transport Industry, Thesis, Victoria University of
Wellington. It is not possible to make a precise distinction
between carriers meeting urban and those meeting rural goods
transport demand.
6.
h 'd' d 14 d I' 15 .In t e Un~te King om an Austra ~a the ~ndustry has a history
of freedom from government controls over price fixing. In the
United States price controls over the industry exist but consist of
a requirement for rates to be published and filed with a government
authority, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Any interested
party, including the Commission, may challenge the rates within
a certain period in which case they are reviewed by the Commission
in the light of its maximum and minimum price criteria. 16
14
British Information Services (1974), Inland Transport in Britain
H.M.S.O., p.lO and Thompson, A.W.J. and Hunter, L.C.· (1973)
The Nationalised Transport Industries, p.241, Heineman, London.
15
Joy, Stewart (1964), op.cit. and Kolsen, H.M. (1968)
The Economics and Control of Road-Rail Competition, Ch.9, Sydney
University Press.
16
Kolsen, H.M., op.cit, Ch.7; Campbell, Thomas C. (1960),
"Agricultural Exemptions from Motor Carrier Regulation",
Land Economics, 36, pp.14-25; Ulrey, IvonW. (1969) The
Economics of Farm Products Transportation, Marketing Research
Report No. 843, Ec. Res. Serv., USDA Washington D.C.
If
7,
3, JUSTIFICATION FOR PRICE FIXATION
The fixation of goods transport charges in New Zealand has the
broad obj ective .,.
of preserving and promoting the social and
ecortomic welfare of New Zealand •• ,.1117
This objective is sufficiently general to be of little use as a
guide to a rate regulatory authority. The legislators obviously
realised that this was the case and provided more specific
objectives. Those relating to goods transport are ".,.
The promotion and maintenance of the economic
stability of New Zealand. ,,18
Further relevant objectives specified in the Act are ....
If • • ,. The desirability of increasing naUonal production
by granting concessions on the carriage of producers'
19goods, If
II The desirability of maintaining a reasonable stan~ard
of living and satisfactory working conditions in the
road transpoy't (industry). ,,20
11•••• The maintenance of the efficiency of the transport
services to which the proceedings relate,,,21
17 Transport Act, 1962, s151
18 Ibid s151 (a)
19 Ibid s151 (b)
20 Ibid s151 (e)
21 Ibid s151 (f)
8.
Stability ,is a dangerous objective in that it can too easily
be interpreted as "a quiet life for established interests".22
This objective could well be removed from the Act.
Concessions for the cartage of producers' goods implies an
advocacy of differential rating practices of the type traditionally
practiced by railways and put forward as a major argument favouring
h 'f 'I f d ,,23 ft e protectlon 0 ral ways rom roa competltlon. In act the
Ministry of Transport has related the prices it sets for road
transport to costs rath~r th~n adopt cross subsidisation in favour
of certain commodities. Accordingly this objective is of little
practical relevance today.
The third specific objective would appear to have been the
leading consideration underlying the transfer of price fixation
controls to the Transport Department in 1950. At that time a
considerable number of ex-servicemen were entering the road
transport industry as independent owner-operators. Indeed in 1950
nearly half of all goods service licences were heldbyex..,servicemen. 24
Few if any of these men were trained in business management. With
price controls more or less unchanged from wartime controls, and
with the cost increases of the post-war inflationary period,
operators began to overload the Transport Charges Committee with
requests for price rises.
22
Joy, Stewart (1964), op.cit. p.275.
23
A.J.H. of R., D2, 1954.
24
49.7 per cent of goods service licences were held by ex-servicemen
in 1950 (A.J.H. of R., H40, 1950, p.31) under the active
encouragement of the Rehabilitation Board (A.J.H. of R., H.18,
1946, p.6).
9.
Serious consideration could then have been given to removing price
control altogether from the increasingly competitive and rapidly
growing industry. Instead price control was tightened and
centralised with price fixation becoming the function of public
servants who could set prices on their own initiative. Minimum
prices became an important regulation. Initially being set at
5 percent below schedule, minimum prices are now set at 10 percent
below schedule.
Undoubtedly the protection of the incomes of ex-servicemen
operators was a leading factor behind the setting of price
minimums. It is reasonable to hypothesize that.the main reas.on
for the industry's acceptance of the increasingly centralised
government setting of prices was a consequence of the income
protection policy. Its main impact was on the small owner-operator
firms which dominated the industry in numbers. In 1950, 83 percent
of firms owned three or fewer trucks and only 5 percent of firms owned
25
eight or more trucks. Price cutting among these operators in
response to competition would have been in the interests of
transport users. At that time, however, farmers were receiving
relatively high incomes and it is likely that the government of
the day gave priority to protecting the incomes of transport
operators to assist the rehabilitation of ex-servicemen.
25
Wilbur Smith and ~ssoc. (1973), New Zealand Transport Policy Study,
Govt. Printer, Wellington, Pt. IV, pp.1-86.
10,
In 1961 distance restrictions were relaxed from 30 miles
to 40 miles for road in competition with rail in the haulage of
26
general goods. All distance restrictions were removed for the
haulage of livestock. This latter relaxation has been credited as
being the cause of the major technical progress within the industry
during the 1960's.27 Trailers were more frequently used and the
average truck size increased. For example from 1963 to 1971 the
proportion of vehicles over 15 tons in weight in the goods service
28industry grew from 8.9 percent to 21.0 percent. During this
period of rapid productivity increase it was not difficult for
operators to achieve efficiency levels above the average obtaining
at the time of the last detailed regional survey, which could be
several years out of date. With the rate schedules designed
to provide an operator of average efficiency with a satisfact.ory
income, most were able to achieve above average incomes. Indeed
statistics of the average incomes of the self employed indicate that
those in the road goods transport industry have been among the
best rewarded of the non-professional self employed (see Table 1).
26
Transport Licencing Regulations 1960
27
Polaschek, R. J. (1969), "Transport and the Sheep Farmer Today",
Sheep Farming Annual, Massey University.
28
Wilbur Smith and Assoc., op.cit" Pt. IV, fP-1-87
TABLE 1
Taxable Incomes of the Self Employed
1974/75 1973/74 1972/73 1971/72 1970/71 1969/70 1968/69 1967/68 1966/67 1965/66 1964/65 1963/64
Agriculture and Livestock Production
Sheep Farming 6,200 8,500 7,500 4,650 3,750 3,900 3,400 3,300 3,220 3,950 4,000 3,480
Dairy Farming 5,500 5,600 5,200 4,500 3,150 3,070 2,560 2,900 3,150 2,960 2,690 2,232
Other Farming 5,100 5,400 4.,450 3,500 3,000 2,850 2,550 2,480 2,690 2,760 2,620 2,386
Manufacturing 6,200 5,450 4,450 4,050 3,500 3,100 2,650 2,620 2,750 2,700 2,770 2,360
Construction
Builders 8,200 6,750 5,400 4,550 4,050 3,560 2,990 3,000 3,170 3,090 2,980 2,678
Building Ancillary Trades 7,100 5,900 4,900 4,300 3,900 3,440 2,950 2,980 2,140 3,120 2,860 2,530
Wholesale and Retail Trade 6,500 5,300 4,300 3,650 3,300 3,040 2,640 2,660 2,750 2,630 2,670 2,404 I-'
I-'
Transport
Road Passengers 4,600 4,250 3,850 3,600 3,050 2,850 2,280 2,350 2,470 2,430 2,360 2,134
Road Freight 8,900 6,700 5,700 4,900 4,600 3,'970 3,740 3,700 3,640 3,580 3,350 2,968
Services ~ Professional
Medical Practitioners 21,900 18,900 16,500 14,500 12,700 10,700 8,840 8,700 8,590 8,370 8,190 7,746
Dental Practitioners 17,100 13,500 11,600 10,250 9,400 8,130 7,700 7,550 7,480 7,420 7,050 6,420
Legal Practitioners 20,100 21,100 16,750 13,600 11,950 10,750 8,500 8,340 8,200 7,990 7,360 6,574
Bublic Accountants 14,300 12,600 10,950 10,0'50 8,600 7,680 6,520 6,450 6,260 6,180 5,820 5,294
Services - Other 5,400 4,500 3,700 3,250 2,900 2,620 2,420 2,380 2,320 2,230 2,160 2,008
(1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4) (4)
Sources: (1) Supplement to Monthly Abstract of Statistics, March 1976
(2) N. Z Official Yearbook, 1974
(3) N. Z.Official Yearbook, 1970
(4) Supplement to Monthly Abstract of Statistics, October 1967
12,
Other considerations are also likely to have maintained the
support of transport operators for price controls, With only a
10 percent negotiating range for all but large contract clients, 29
there is little point in transport users seeking several competitive
quotes. Indeed a recent survey by the author revealed that of
1,664 South Island farmers only 10 percent made a practice of
obtaining several quotes. Instead the survey showed that 83 percent
of farmers indicated that they preferred to remain loyal to one
firm in anticipation of better service. In practice the survey
showed that 82 percent of South Island farmers used only one transport
operauor for 75 percent or more 0+ their livestock transport; and
52 percent used only one operator for all their livestock transport.
Competition in the industry has been shifted from price
competition to service competition by the price fixation procedures.
Service competition has its advantages but the question must be
asked : is it a luxury that users c~n afford?
Rate schedules also remove a substantial cost accounting and
price setting responsibility from operators. Owner-operators
untrained in business management are assured of reasonable
financial security by charging the schedule prices and by at
least matching the industry's average throughput of work.
Finally, established operators may see the acceptance of
government cqntrol over their pricing as a reasonable quid pro
quo for the granting of protection against free entry to the
industry.
29
The annual use which a client must make of a carrier before a
contract discount may be negotiated must amount toa certain
sum at schedule rates. The sum varies between area schedu.les
up to $1,500 but averages around $1,000, An exception is the
Nelson area where the amount is $500 per job.
13,
Returning to the list of objectives set down for price control,
the last specified by the Act relates to efficiency, Price control
fn the rural road goods transport industry is inconsistent with
the attainment of maximum economic efficiency.
Firstly, the prinicple of price control, as practiced over the
industry, mitigates against operators going out of their way to
increase their productivity. A cost increase is followed by an
approach to the Secretary for Transport to grant a carefully calculated
percentage increase in rates according to the effect of the cost
. . h . d 30. .~ncrease on total operat~ng costs. T e In ustry malntalns an index
of costs ~ighted proportionately by each cost item (wages, fuel, etc.)
for this purpose. The Sec:r;etary for Transport is then placed in the
difficult position of trying to reduce the allowed increase by an
amount that he thinks the industry could absorb due to greater
productivity.31 In a more competitive prioing system prices would
undoubtedly rise due to inflation : but there would always be
pressure on each firm to minimise the increase by improving
productivity in order to maintain or improve its market share.
The industry would be more likely to fully exercise its potential
for vroductivity increase in this way than through an arbitrary
estimation by a government department.
30
Road rransport Association (Inc.)
31
In Decision Number 3588 the Secretary of Transport granted
a 3.3 percent increase in rural cartage rate schedules after
NZ Transport Assn. Inc. had requested a 3.6 percent increase.
14.
It can be argued that productivity in the transport industry
has increased substantially and that much of the gain has been
32passed on to the w,?ers. 'rhe incentive to increase productivity
at present is much more a carrot that a stick, By operating at
greater than average productivity gre~ter rewards are obtainable
from schedule prices, as reflected by the relatively high average
incomes in the industry cited previously, and market shares remain
much the same. Firms operating at relatively low levels of
productivity can also maintain their market share but simply
make less profit. In the traditional competitive model market
shares are variable with productivity due to the capacity of high
productivity firms to undercut rates and draw off patronage. Low
productivity firms have to improve their efficiency or lose their
market.
Rate cutting should not be seen as a destructive and undesirable
practice. Arguments assigning these characteristics to rate cutting
arose during the 1930's. The justification for these arguments
h b 1 b . d 33 d h . f .as su sequent y een questlone an t e' experl.ence a deregulated
road transport in Australia indicates that rate cutti.ng does not
assume these characteristics when it is permitted. 34
32
Habgood, J. (1976), "The Road Transport Operator's Situation &
Views" , paper presented at a Seminar on "Costs Beyond the Farm
Gate~, Lincoln College.
33
Macleod, W.M. and Walters, A. A. (1956), "A Note on Bankruptcy
in Road Haulage", J. of Industrial Economics, pp. 63-67.
34
Joy, Stewart, op.cit. p.280
"This was shown in the trade receSS1.-on of 1960-1 when rates
rarely fell even below long run direct costs and owners
unable to find work !lor their vehicles at profitable rate8~
either diverted them 'to other uses or laid them up. 11
l5,
Rate cutting is really just another term for price competition in
which the high productivity operator has the advantage. To avoid
the nuisance of small incompetent operators setting irrationally
low prices to win traffic a solution of education and a maintenance
of managerial standards is preferable to overall rate regulation. 35
The possibility of large firms undercutting to eliminate competition
("predatory pricing") is a case for special monopoly controls
rather than overall rate regulation.
The second area where price control is inconsistent with economic
efficiency also concerns market shares. As already noted service
competition rather than price competition is a feature of industries
with regulated price minimums. Some services are valued by users
especially when they involve him in no additional costs. It is
hardly surprising that a user will prefer to patronise a firm
prepared to man a telephone at all hours rather than one which is
not when both charge the same schedule rates. It is by this means,
and by mergers and takeovers, that market shares are manipulated
in the industry in New Zealand. In fact transport users are in
danger of thinking that they are getting something for nothing.
The various services provided by operators get built into their
cost structure each time a regional survey of operating practices
and costs is carried out by the Ministry of Transport. Users
pay for additional services through higher overall transport costs.
Because all users pay much the same prices it is rational for
farmers to demand as much service as possible because the additional
costs are shared by those making only moderate demands. Operators
are faced with difficulties in meeting unreasonable demands. 36
35
E.E.C. requirements for road hauliers to be "reputable, possess
adequate financial resources and to be professionally competent"
are being developed. (Freight Transport, British Information
Services, March 1975.)
36
Habgood,op~cit.
16.
There is no doubt that transport users are paying more than
they would if economic efficiency was a primary objective of rate
regulation in rural road goods transport f
37
example, betweenFor
February 1969 and March 1970 a penalty clause was included in
the Southland Area Rate Schedule (clause 14). It enabled Sunday
premiums to be charged for livestock if tallies were not provided
to the carrier by 6 pm. the previous day. While clause 14 was in
force carriers made sufficient savings in costs t.o offer a 5
percent discount in standard livei:ltock cartage rates, largely
because of better vehicle utilisation due to better planning in
38
advance of the next day!s work.
37
Oort, C.J., op.cit., ~h.XVI covers the theoretical aspects of this
question. Nelson, James, C., (1973) in "Impact of Ent.ry Control
on Transport Pricing", Criteria for Transport Pricing, ed. Fair,
Marvin L., and Nelson, James R., Cornell Maritime Press Inc.,
Cambridge,U S A,reports on some practical experience:
liThe USDA found the truck rates charged by carriers during
1956 and 1957~ the first years of free entry~ were approximately
33 percent below the 1952 regulated rates on fresh poultry~ and
36 percent below the 1955 rate on frozen poultry. Truck rates
on frozen fruits and vegetables during 1957 ranged from 11 to
29 percent below the regulated rates of 1955. Not only were
the rates under free entry measurably lower~ but USDA studies
found that expemt trucking rates have been relatively stable
and sufficiently high to attract enough capital investment to
provide growing capacity and modern equipment for exempt
trucking. When frozen fruits and vegetables were again
regulated by the Transportation Act of 1958~ rates changed
notably., with increases predominating. If (see p.274)
A review of the literature on the question is given in Johnson,
James C. and Harper, Donald V. (1975), "The Potential Consequences
of Deregulation of TransportU , L~nd Economics, 51 (1), pp. 58-71
38
Refer to Secretary of Transport's Decisions No. 2618 (10 Sept 1968)
2687 (12 Feb. 1969) and 2770 (13 March 1970) under the Transport
Act 1962.
17.
With schedule prices being based on average cost there
are few signals to inform users that they are demanding high cost
services; or that they are saving costs for the carrier by
moderating their demands, The Southland experience indicates
beyond doubt the absurdity of trying to prescribe by rate schedules
a matter which is far too complex to be reduced to a single clause,
Operators, users and administrators recognised the need for a change
but were unable to agree on the precise nature of the change,
Competition with freedom in rate setting would be more likely to
arrive at workable solutions to such matters than are administrative
measures,
18.
4. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
39The Transport Policy Study of 1973 has already raised the issue
of road transport pricing and recommended a relaxation of the existing
h d . 40 f 11 h .controls. In essence, t e recommen atJ..ons 0 ow t e recommenda tlons
made by the authors (e,g. by Oort {1970}). The key changes proposed
are the abandonment of minimum rates, the relaxation of quantity controls
over entry to the industry and some control over the development of
regional monopolies,
Firstly the fixing of a minimum rate in rural goods transport
needs to be abandoned. Although it may have served a useful purpose
in guaranteeing income for ex~servicemen owner operators during the
1950's, transport users, especially farmers, now have a more
legitimate claim in the national interest than do the existing
transport operators for protection of their net incomes.
It can be argued that licenced operators are bound, as a
condi tion of their licences t,o meet certain "common carrier"
obligations. They should therefore be protected against outside
operators who undercut their x'ates for their more remunerative
traffics - It cream skimmi.r~gn as it has become known. In the case
of scheduled carriers this argument is not unreasonable but
"common carrier" obligations are largely mythical in the rural road
goods transport industry where few scheduled services are offered,
39
Wilbur Smith and Assoc., op.cit.
40
Oort, Conrad J" op.cit
19.
Minimum prices can be justified as a protection for small
operators against attempts by large operators to drive them out
of business. A large firm could accept a period of loss making in
order to eliminate competition in anticipation of later freedom
to charge relatively high prices. Such activity is contrary to
the long term interests of both operators and users and provision
should exist for it to be checked. Adequate protection could be
achieved from some auditing procedure by the Ministry of Transport
supplemented by a right for operators to initiate the exercise of
such procedures over a rate cutting competit.oro The criterion of
prices not falling below variable costs should be applied by the
Ministry, not a criterion of full or average costs as at present
used to set minimum rates. The administrative load on the
Ministry can be minimised by using an index of costs, by requiring
rates to be reported and by investigating exceptions rather than
all rates.
Secondly, the present average cost basis for rate making needs
to be replaced by prices reflecting the consumption of economic
. 41. .
resources lncurred. By thls means users maklng unreasonable
demands, such a~ special trips just to deliver a small item, or
demanding service at unreasonable times wit.h unreasonable notice,
would face the disincentive of having to pay a higher price to
compensate the operator for the costs he incurs in providing extra
services. With a regime of price competition replacing service
competition it is unlikely that such particularly demanding users
will get what they want cheaply from another firm. Rather than
having to subsidise unreasonable users, transport users making
reasonable demands will stand to be rewarded by lower transport
charges. In due course significant changes in farming practices
especially some spreading of the peaks in demand for transport
services and more planning of transport needs could be expected to
take place; and to result in better co~ordination of demand and supply
in the industry and therefore lower overall transport costs for farmers.
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A.J.E. of R., F.14, 1976, "Interim Report on Transport.", Section 2
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The price setting respons.ibility would pass to operators who
would have flexibility to charger as is the case in any other
business, any price above variable costs provided that overall
profitability satisfies shareholders and provided monopoly prices
are not charged. Thus capacity is likely to be better utilised
for example where low rates can be offered to make otherwise
empty backhauls productive for both operator and user.
Informed operators are a prerequisite to making such a system
workable. Education programmes, published data on costs and minimum
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educatlon standards as prerequlsJ..tes for entry to the lndustry are
some of the alternative measures possible to ensure that operators
are informed.
Thirdly is the need to relax quantity controls over entry
into the rural goods transport industry and to free the existing
restrictions on carriers operat.ing in licencing districts other
than their own. This measure would provide the incentive for
operators to keep prices down and service levels up and t.herefore
would mitigate against the development of regional monopolies.
It would also mitigate against the development of unduly large
firms in some regions, a development likely to lead to regional
monopolies and one unjustified by economies of scale in trucking. 43
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The E.E.C.has such entry controls in mind although their
precise nature is not easy to decide since written examinations
are not necessarily the best test.
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Nelson, James C. (1965), "'I'he Effects of Entry Control in Surface
Transport", Transport~ation Economics, N .B.E .R. Spec. Conf. 17,.
New York, covers these issues fully.
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Large firms are (3,180 unpopula~' with. t.ransport users. In a recent
survey by the aUJchor 65 percent of farmers disagreed ;''lith the
statement ·that large firms v.Tere better Jchan small, 18 percent
agreed and 17 percent had no opinion, In the answers to another
question the proportion of farmers considering that they had no
choice of transport fi.:r:m in their area was 17 percent 0
In spite of relaxed entry controls to the industry, pockets
where regional monopolies can exist are almost certain to arise.
This is especially so w'here "thin n market conditions apply, i. eo
where demand is too low to support more than one operator. A
maximum price control may still be required. The best form for
this control to take is for the Ministry of Transport to have an
auditing function checking against excessive profiteering. A
criterion of maximum percentage mark up on over variable costs
b ' .. d . 44 hwould e a sUltably obJectlve eVlce. T ere would have to be
rights for users to call in the Ministry to carry out this function
as well as for it to make routine checks. Because there will be
few cases for thin markets, the administrators load on the
Ministry would be light. in the int~erests of taxpayers.
44
A Canadian precedent exists where the maximum rate is set at
250 percent of the vaxiable cost of the movemenL Stenason, W.J.
and Romoff, H.M. (1973), "Transport Pricing and Regulated Competition,
the Canadian Experience ll , in criteria for Tr.ansportat.ion Pricing
op.cit., pp 209~210
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5, FARMER INITIATIVE
In the past Federated Farmers of N.Z. (Inc.) has had
little to say about the principle of price fixing in the rural road
transport industry although it is consulted when changes to schedules
are proposed. The organisation's main interest has been in removing
restrictions placed on competition by road transport with rail
transport. Exemptions to these limits already granted to agricultural
commodities much reduce the potential savings to farmers to
furthering the issue. Much greater potential savin~ lie in a
review of road transport price fixing procedures.
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